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RESUMO
Vamos assumir que a oferta de trabalho consiste de dois tipos de trabalhadores, 1 e 2. Am-
bos os trabalhadores são igualmente produtivos e exibem funções de oferta com a mesma 
elasticidade. Consideramos uma firma (empresário ou acionistas), a qual é competitiva no 
mercado de produtos e monopsonista nos mercados de insumos. A firma usa os serviços de 
um gerente quem tem um alto capital humano e cujo salário é dado pelo mercado. Suponha-
mos que o gerente não gosta de trabalhar com um tipo de trabalhador, digamos o tipo 1. Se 
permitirmos que o esforço do gerente seja um insumo adicional sem nenhum custo extra 
(além de seu salário), a decisão de salários será diferente para ambos os trabalhadores. Isto 
é, haverá um diferencial de salários e, em conseqüência, uma discriminação econômica
1
 
endógena nos mercados de trabalho. 
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ABSTRACT
Assume a labor supply consisting of two types of workers, 1 and 2. Both workers are  equally
productive and exhibit supply functions with the same elasticity. We consider a  firm (entre-
preneur or shareholders) that is competitive in the output market and  monopsonistic in in-
put markets. The firm uses the services of a manager who has a high  human capital and
whose wage is given by the market. It is supposed that the manager  does not like to work
with one type of worker, say type 1. If we allow the manager's  effort to be an additional in-
put without any extra (in addition to his salary) cost for the  firm, then the firm's pricing de-
cision will be different for both workers. That is, there will  be a wage
differential and therefore endogenous economic discrimination
2
 in the labor markets.
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1 Ver BLACK (1995) para uma definição de discriminação econômica. 
2 See BLACK (1995) for a definition of economic discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
The production, and consequently the profit, of the firm may be affected by
the relationship among its workers. This relationship may be positive, in the
sense that it may stimulate an increase in the production without any addi-
tional cost for the firm. The productivity of a worker may increase if his
workmate exhibits a behavior that motivates him. This behavior would not
be economic, but would rather be related to education, good humor, or eth-
nic characteristics, etc.
However, the opposite may occur. That is, the production level may be af-
fected in a negative way (tendency to fall) because of the bad relationship
among workers. For instance,  the simple fact of being envious of someone
(see FARIA, 1998) or not liking to work with a certain employee may be
an incentive that negatively affects the productivity of some workers, and
therefore the production level of the firm. There are several situations in
which this bad relationship may arise and, at the same time, there are many
solutions. To quote just a few: one worker that creates
3
 conflict among oth-
er workers could simply be dismissed or moved to another place where the
firm operates. However, when the employee is a manager (or a high-stand-
ing employee) whose human capital is high, the problem is not so easy to
solve. The supply of this kind of employee is scarce and to fire him could
bring bad consequences for the firm.
As the only aim of the firm is to maximize profits, they (entrepreneur or
householders) will have several alternatives to handle this situation without
incurring additional costs. In these cases, there should be some kind of bar-
gaining between the firm and the manager: from an economic point of
view, it would be better if the firm maintained such a manager,
4
 provided he
does not require extra salary from the firm, than to hire more workers who
annoy him. On the other hand, for each worker
5
 not hired, the manager
must increase his own effort in order to maintain the production level. That
is, the cost must be only of the manager and not of the firm (entrepreneurs
3 The worker may have a characteristic that annoys his workmates.
4 Although he may not like some workers that the firm might hire.
5 Discriminated by the manager.
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or shareholders). From this point on, we shall refer to such a manager as
discriminating manager.
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to solve the firm's problem in the
presence of a discriminating manager. Since the problem is in the labor mar-
ket, we assume the firm is monopsonistic in this market, and not in the
markets of managers, and competitive in the output markets. Therefore, a
solution for the firm would be to allow the manager to have a kind of pow-
er of decision that affects the hiring decisions (of the firm). The cost of this
power of decision would be his effort. To be more precise, the manager
would have to increase his effort and not demand any extra salary (which
will in turn increase the level of production)  to avoid the necessity of hiring
more workers that annoy the discriminating manager. Thus there is a trade-
off that the manager has to face: to increase his effort and to have to put up
with employees who annoy him.
The results of this paper show that the trade-off faced by the discriminator
manager brings a wage differential as a consequence, which in turn causes
economic discrimination (from entrepreneurs or shareholders)  in the labor
markets. Thus discrimination emerges in an endogenous way.
To place our paper in the context of the existing literature, it is useful to
mention that this paper is closer to the pioneering works of  Becker (1971)
and Arrow (1973), than to that of Phelps (1972). The work of Phelps  is
more concerned with statistical discrimination, which is an important sub-
ject but does not concern us here. Our work is closer to the employer dis-
crimination model of Becker (1971). In Becker's work the firm maximizes
profits without taking into account any employee's effort, but considers the
coefficient of discrimination due to a taste for discrimination. However, our
model incorporates the manager's effort as an additional input without in-
curring any cost.  We wish to clarify that almost all of the theoretical works
have been developed within a competitive setting. Ours is quite different
since the firm in our model acts competitively in the output market and as a
monopsony in the labor markets.
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The reason we consider a monopsony is for the sake of simplicity since  the
only thing that we want to analyze is that the firm has a certain market
power. A similar work – concerning to the degree of monopsonistic power –
was analyzed by Black (1995) in the context of labor market search model.
Despite this power, the decision of the base salary depends on the elasticity
of the supply of labor. If the monopsonistic firm faces labor supplies sharing
the same elasticity, there will be no economic discrimination. However, if
there is a discriminating manager, economic  discrimination on the part of
the monopsonistic firm will appear. We must stress that  our discrimination
is due to friction among workers. Among the authors of works concerning
this kind of discrimination Frijters (1997) stands out.
It would be useful to point out the fundamental difference between the effi-
ciency wage model of Solow (1979) and ours. While in the latter the firms
pay above market-clear wages in order to motivate workers  to raise their ef-
fort, in our model the firm stops hiring workers of type A to stimulate the
manager to increase his effort. For another way of incorporating the manag-
er's behavior in the firm's
6
 decisions, see Faria (2000).
It would be useful to mention authors who explain the reason for wage dif-
ferentials. Among the most important we find Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
Akerlof and Yellen (1986), and Krueger and Summers (1988).
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 1 we present the model and
state and prove our main result. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.
1.  THE MODEL 
Let us consider a firm which produces a single output using two types of
workers. We assume that these workers are economically identical (i.e.
workers are perfect substitutes, their supply functions have equal elasticity)
and that their only differences are some characteristics that do not influence
6 Although this doesn´t yield discrimination.
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in the productive process of the firm. These characteristics may be race, age,
sex, or some other  publicly observable trait.
The firm is assumed to be  competitive in the output market and monop-
sonist in input markets. In addition, let us suppose that the firm is managed
by someone who does not like one of the two kinds of workers. This dislike
is expressed by an increase in the manager's effort, which means   more in-
put without any additional cost for the firm in order to avoid contact with
such a group of workers. In other words, if the firm would hire less workers
discriminated by the manager, the latter  would be willing to increase his ef-
fort to maintain the production level.
The technology of the firm is represented by the production function
 which is assumed to be strictly concave and to depend on
the hours worked by both types of workers, and those of the discriminating
manager as well as his effort  depending on the number of type 1
workers and his own wage . Since the manager's wage is given by the
firm, for the sake of simplicity we can assume that the effort e depends only
on the hours worked  by type 1 workers.
Let us assume that the supply function for both type 1 and type 2 workers
are  and  which have all the properties (e.g. strictly mono-
tone)  to guarantee the existence of the inverse functions  and
 representing the wages type 1 and 2 workers, respectively.
Therefore, the goal of the firm can be stated in  two equivalent ways: one in
terms of  supply functions:
, 
subject to
and the other in terms of inverse supply functions:
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subject to
Since the two problems above are equivalent, the choice is exclusively for
convenience. We choose the latter. Also, notice that constraints are binding
(the monopsonist would forgo profits if he hired labor above the wage for
which workers would be willing to sell their labor). Therefore, the firm's de-
cision problem can be reduced to the unconstrained  program:
                   
                  (1) 
 
where C denotes the cost function:
which is assumed to be a strictly convex. For instance,  and 
could be  and  respectively, with  and with elasticity
Remark: Before solving the firm's problem, let us discuss the case in which
the manager's effort is missing. To put things in a simple way, let us assume
conditions that assure an interior solution which will be characterized by:
                                            
 (2)
                                           (3)
                                                                          (4) 
 
As we are interested in the wage differential, we divide equation (2) by
equation (3) to obtain:
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which, in terms of the elasticities, is equivalent to
                                
         (5)
From (5) it follows that the wage differential is due to the elasticity of the
supply functions of the type of workers. However, if we assume, in addition
to equal productivity, that both elasticities are equal, there would be no dis-
crimination (the wage would be equal). Now, if we assume that the mana-
ger's effort affects the production level and represents no additional cost for
the firm, then the discrimination emerges in an endogenous way because of
the trade-off between effort and the number of type 1 workers. This trade-
off is represented by the condition  That is, if the firm decides to
hire less  workers of type 1, the manager would be willing to increase his
effort to maintain the production level.
Formally our main result is stated in the following theorem
Theorem 1: If the type 1 and 2 workers have the same productivity
7
,  and, in
addition, both supply functions have the same elasticity, then a sufficient condition
for the firm to discriminate type 1 workers is that its manager faces a trade-off be-
tween his effort level and the number of workers of type 1.
Proof: From properties imposed on the production function  and supply
functions  we can conclude that there exists a unique solution that
can be found by solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
                                 
(6)
7 In the sense that they are perfect substitutes.
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                                                 (7) 
                       (8)
                                     (9)
 (10)
In principle, we may have a corner solution  But if
 an interior solution is assured, which is
characterized by (6), (7), (8) and (9) with equality.
As remarked above, we divide the equation (7) by equation (8) to obtain:
which, in terms of  elasticities, is equivalent to
But, as we are assuming equal elasticities the right-hand side of the previous
equality is reduced to Therefore, one has
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Since the wages are positive, the factor must be positive as
well. But as e´ (x
1
) < 0, then  such a factor must be strictly less than one, so
W
1
(x
1
)< W
2
(x
2
). Therefore, there exists economic discrimination and the
theorem is completed.
Remarks: If we consider e´(x
1
) > 0 instead of e´(x
1
) < 0 the conclusion of
Theorem 1 would be a wage differential against workers of type 2. There-
fore, it does not matter if he likes or dislikes workers of type 1 for the firm
to discriminate. In other terms, it is sufficient to assume e´ (x
1
) ≠ 0 (in The-
orem 1) for the firm to assign different wages.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that if a manager of a monopsonistic firm does
not like one of two kinds of workers that the firm has available to hire, this
fact alone is a sufficient condition for economic discrimination to emerge in
an endogenous way in the labor market. To reach this result we had to im-
pose, in addition to having the same productivity, one additional condition:
both supply functions should have the same elasticity. This would guarantee
wage differentials, and therefore discrimination. Notice that in our model
different wages are assigned to equally productive workers who have equal
supply elasticities.
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Finally, our result shows that the interaction among workers of a same firm
may have bad consequences in terms of production. In this way, our result
suggests that firms should design good mechanisms to improve relation-
ships among their employees, and thus eliminate discrimination.
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